Difference between revisions of "Traulsen and Reed 2012"
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| + | =Citation= | ||
Traulsen, A. and F. A. Reed. (2012) From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance of meiotic drive alleles. [[Journal of Theoretical Biology]] 299: 120-125. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032 | Traulsen, A. and F. A. Reed. (2012) From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance of meiotic drive alleles. [[Journal of Theoretical Biology]] 299: 120-125. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032 | ||
| − | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519311002335 | + | =Links= |
| + | *https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519311002335 | ||
=Published Abstract= | =Published Abstract= | ||
| − | + | ==Abstract== | |
Evolutionary change can be described on a genotypic level or a phenotypic level. Evolutionary game theory is typically thought of as a phenotypic approach, although it is frequently argued that it can also be used to describe population genetic evolution. Interpreting the interaction between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game leads to interesting alternative perspectives on genetic evolution. Here we focus on the case of meiotic drive and illustrate how meiotic drive can be directly and precisely interpreted as a social dilemma, such as the prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, in which the drive allele takes more than its fair share. Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to the well understood cyclic dominance found in the rock-paper-scissors game. This perspective is well established for the replicator dynamics, but there is still considerable ground for mutual inspiration between the two fields. For example, evolutionary game theorists can benefit from considering the stochastic evolutionary dynamics arising from finite population size. Population geneticists can benefit from game theoretic tools and perspectives on genetic evolution. | Evolutionary change can be described on a genotypic level or a phenotypic level. Evolutionary game theory is typically thought of as a phenotypic approach, although it is frequently argued that it can also be used to describe population genetic evolution. Interpreting the interaction between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game leads to interesting alternative perspectives on genetic evolution. Here we focus on the case of meiotic drive and illustrate how meiotic drive can be directly and precisely interpreted as a social dilemma, such as the prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, in which the drive allele takes more than its fair share. Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to the well understood cyclic dominance found in the rock-paper-scissors game. This perspective is well established for the replicator dynamics, but there is still considerable ground for mutual inspiration between the two fields. For example, evolutionary game theorists can benefit from considering the stochastic evolutionary dynamics arising from finite population size. Population geneticists can benefit from game theoretic tools and perspectives on genetic evolution. | ||
| + | ==Highlights== | ||
| + | *Population genetic models for diploids with a single locus are equivalent to evolutionary two player games. | ||
| + | *Meiotic drive is often equivalent to a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. | ||
| + | *Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to rock–paper–scissors like cycles. | ||
| + | *Connecting population genetics to evolutionary game theory allows for a rich flow of insights between the fields. | ||
=Notes= | =Notes= | ||
| − | |||
There is a mistake in the derivation of one of the equations in this paper. It does not change any of the fundamental results and has turned out to be a valuable teaching tool. In some of my graduate classes I have the students re-derive the equation, which leads to a transition from initially thinking that they have done it wrong to realizing the published form is wrong. This teaches them to be confident in their own abilities and to not stubbornly believe what is published if it doesn't hold up to analysis. | There is a mistake in the derivation of one of the equations in this paper. It does not change any of the fundamental results and has turned out to be a valuable teaching tool. In some of my graduate classes I have the students re-derive the equation, which leads to a transition from initially thinking that they have done it wrong to realizing the published form is wrong. This teaches them to be confident in their own abilities and to not stubbornly believe what is published if it doesn't hold up to analysis. | ||
[[Category:Publication]] | [[Category:Publication]] | ||
Latest revision as of 02:25, 1 October 2018
Citation
Traulsen, A. and F. A. Reed. (2012) From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance of meiotic drive alleles. Journal of Theoretical Biology 299: 120-125. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032
Links
Published Abstract
Abstract
Evolutionary change can be described on a genotypic level or a phenotypic level. Evolutionary game theory is typically thought of as a phenotypic approach, although it is frequently argued that it can also be used to describe population genetic evolution. Interpreting the interaction between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game leads to interesting alternative perspectives on genetic evolution. Here we focus on the case of meiotic drive and illustrate how meiotic drive can be directly and precisely interpreted as a social dilemma, such as the prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, in which the drive allele takes more than its fair share. Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to the well understood cyclic dominance found in the rock-paper-scissors game. This perspective is well established for the replicator dynamics, but there is still considerable ground for mutual inspiration between the two fields. For example, evolutionary game theorists can benefit from considering the stochastic evolutionary dynamics arising from finite population size. Population geneticists can benefit from game theoretic tools and perspectives on genetic evolution.
Highlights
- Population genetic models for diploids with a single locus are equivalent to evolutionary two player games.
- Meiotic drive is often equivalent to a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game.
- Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to rock–paper–scissors like cycles.
- Connecting population genetics to evolutionary game theory allows for a rich flow of insights between the fields.
Notes
There is a mistake in the derivation of one of the equations in this paper. It does not change any of the fundamental results and has turned out to be a valuable teaching tool. In some of my graduate classes I have the students re-derive the equation, which leads to a transition from initially thinking that they have done it wrong to realizing the published form is wrong. This teaches them to be confident in their own abilities and to not stubbornly believe what is published if it doesn't hold up to analysis.
